republics. Indeed, it was the regions that early on dictated the agenda of the federal contract, that is, the shape and form the Russian Federation should assume. During the early years of the transition, the federal government remained reactive and tried to adapt to the agenda set by the maverick regions. The 1993 Russian constitution recognized the possibility of an asym metric configuration of intergovernmental relations between the regions and the federal government.
In the eyes of many, the asymmetric design of the system of intergovern mental fiscal relations saved Russia from falling into an abyss of civil wars as in Chechnya, and thus kept the country from disintegrating. However, asym metric federalism has not been without its costs. A number of observers have explained many of the problems and tribulations Russia has faced in the last decade-lack of fiscal discipline, economic stagnation and so on-as having roots in asymmetric federalism and the federal government's inability to enforce federal laws throughout the Russian Federation. In 1997-98, the administration of President Boris Yeltsin started a campaign to rein in the regions. This policy was significantly increased by the new administration of President Vladimir Putin, who, since he took over in 2000, has made gaining control over the regions and enforcing federal laws a cornerstone of his administration.
The trademark of the early years of the Yeltsin administration was to accommodate the demands for more autonomy with concessions to the most aggressive regions that basically gave them more favourable treatment within the framework of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Leaving aside the issue of Chechnya, this special treatment did not succeed in quieting those demands. Part of the problem was self-inflicted, in that early on, Yeltsin saw the regional demands as a strategic weapon that he could use in his fight for political dominance with the legislative branch, the Supreme Soviet. Yeltsin eventually prevailed over parliament, but things got too far away from Yeltsin for him to reclaim control over the powerful and now democratically elected governors he had created. During the Yeltsin years, many regions behaved as if they saw little benefit from being part of the federation and acted prepon derantly with a narrow, selfish view and not in the national interest. This sce nario changed radically with Putin's election as president in March 2000. Putin was elected with a wide margin and his popularity allowed him to immediately take on the regional governors and reduce their power.
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the role, significance and effects of asymmetric federalism in the Russian Federation to draw a number of useful lessons in relation to those things that have worked and others that have not. The organization of fiscal federalism in Russia continues to evolve. Where President Putin and his administration actually want to take fiscal federalism is uncertain, but more central control from Moscow and a strengthened state appear to be high on the policy agenda. This does not nec essarily mean that sustained fiscal recentralization will occur. However, the most recent changes in 2004 following the Beslan school hostage crisis in southern Russia signal a further swing toward centralization in the country. The most significant of these changes is President Putin's call for the elimi nation of democratic elections for regional governors and having them directly appointed from Moscow.
The next section describes the significant economic, geographic and ethnic diversity of Russia's regions in some detail. This is followed by a discussion of the principles and theory of asymmetric federalism. The next section reviews the nature and extent of asymmetric federalism in Russia (I do not discuss in any depth the conflict in Chechnya; for this see Lapidus 1998) . The chapter then examines how well the asymmetric design of intergovernmental fiscal relations has worked before turning to a discussion of the future of fis cal decentralization in Russia and what role asymmetric policies are expected to play.
REGIONAL DIVERSITY
Russia is the largest country in the world, spanning 11 time zones and 17 mil lion square kilometres (see Figure 8 .1 for a map of Russia). It encompasses 89 regional autonomous governments (grouped into 11 areas for statistical pur poses) with a total population of 145.9 million in 2000. Russia's regions are diverse in terms of economic conditions, ethnic composition, language and religious and historical differences. The 1993 constitution states that of the 89 'subjects of the federation', which I will refer to as regions, 21 are republics, made up of the former autonomous republics and most of the autonomous oblasts in the former Soviet Union; 55 are regular Russian oblasts and krays; 2 are the city regions of Moscow, the capital, and St Petersburg, the capital from the time of Peter the Great until the Soviet era; and 11 are autonomous okrugs (AOs), including the Jewish autonomous oblast. 1 Even though the Russian Federation theoretically consists of 89 regions, because of the on going civil war in one of its regions, Chechnya, statistics and reports often refer to only 88 regions.
Many of the ethnic republics tend to be quite poor and are often located on the periphery of the country, with higher transportation costs to main markets and alienation from the country's mainstream. This group includes the republics of Tuva, Buryatia, Karelia, Chechnya and Dagestan. At the same time, several ethnic republics are rich in natural resources and have been at the vanguard of demands for autonomy and separatist threats. This group includes Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha (Yakutia). Table 8 .1 presents the main features of the regions for the 11 geographical areas, and the appendix shows the feature for all 89 regions. The most striking feature is the unevenness of the distribution of land and population. For example, the East Siberia Area and the Far Eastern Area combined represent more than 60 per cent of the territory of the country but barely over 11 per cent of the population. By contrast, the Central Area, which includes Moscow, represents 2.8 per cent of the area of the country but 20 per cent of the popu lation. In terms of population density, it is less than 0.1 person per square kilometre in Taimyrsky AO in East Siberia and 8631 people per square kilo metre in Moscow.
Main Regional Features
The regions also differ in the vertical structure of government. The bud getary system across regions is quite diverse, with regions having three to five levels of government, but not all of them with a separate budget (Kurlyandskaya 2001) . In some regions, the regional authorities have a two-tier govern ment structure. This typically happens in regions where municipalities are subordinated to rayon (county) governments. This second tier of regional government typically has a purely executive function and the authorities are appointed by the regional centre, which is, however, assigned its own operat ing budget.
Demographic Changes
During the last decade of economic transition, Russia has lost population. The country's population stood at 148.7 million in 1992, but was down to 145.9 million in 2000 (Table 8 .2). Most regions suffered population losses from 1991 to 1999 that were as high as 6.6 per cent in the Central Area, which includes Moscow. The notable exceptions were several ethnic republics and AOs that experienced natural increases in population during the period, for example, Dagestan, Chukotskiy AO, Ingushetiya and Yamalo Neteskiy AO. Those experiencing the largest negative natural changes in population were the regions in the corridor between Moscow and St. Petersburg (Tver, Nov gorod, Pkov and Leningrad oblasts).
The areas have varied much more widely in terms of changes in population caused by net migration. The two main migration processes during the transi tion years were the return of Russians from other former Soviet republics and out-migration from the more inhospitable regions in the north and far east to the western and southern parts of Russia (Heleniak 1997) . The big losers were the Far Eastern Area, which lost 10.7 per cent of its population in 1991-99, and the Northern Area, which lost 5.1 per cent (Table 8. 3). These area aver ages conceal some dramatic differences within the areas. For example, in the Far Eastern Area, the Chuotsky AO lost more than half of its population and Magadan oblast lost 40 per cent. These are remote, isolated areas with harsh living conditions that lost strategic military value with the end of the Cold War. 2 Another big loser in net migration was Chechnya because of its seces sionist war. The big winners in net migration were warmer and more hospitable parts of the country, such as the Central Cherzozem (Black Soil) Area, with the population of Belgorod oblast, for example, increasing by 11.8 per cent, and the North Caucasian Area, with the population of Krasnodar kray increasing by 11.4 per cent. Kaliningrad oblast, a western enclave in the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania, was also a big winner in net migration, up 10.8 per cent in 1991-99. An interesting observation is that Moscow, by far the richest and most attractive destination in economic terms, did not experience much net migra tion: 2.2 per cent during 1991-99. This may have been due to Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's illegal demands that would-be residents apply for residency per mits, 3 but also by the scarcity and high cost of housing. In St. Petersburg, where there has been no highly publicized enforcement of residency permits, but where the cost of housing is high and which experienced much less eco nomic growth than Moscow, net migration was a negative 0.1 per cent. Note that the oblasts surrounding the two cities, Leningrad oblast and Moscow oblast, experienced much higher net migration during the period, 8.3 per cent and 4.3 per cent, respectively.
Ethnic Diversity and Relative Geographic Remoteness
The Russian Federation has significant ethnic diversity, but much less than in the former Soviet Union. Lapidus (1999, p. 75) describes the 21 ethnically defined republics of the Russia Federation as 'islands in an ethnically Russian sea.' As Table 8 . 4 indicates, in 1989, 88 per cent of the country's population was ethnic Russian. The ethnic nationalities tend to be concentrated along the periphery of the country, such as the North Caucasian Area, but even here some three-quarters of the population are ethnic Russians. However, in 11 regions, ethnic nationalities account for more than half the population. These are the Chuvasia republic, the Kalmikya republic, the Tatarstan republic, the Dagestan republic, the Ingushetiya republic (which includes Chechnya), the KabardinoBalkaria republic, the Karachaevo-Cherkesskaya republic, the North Osetia republic, Komi-Permyatskaya AO, the Tuva republic and Aginskiy Buryatskiy AO. In some of these regions 'titular' nationals (or the main ethnic group) con stitute a majority of the population. In addition to titular nationals, Goskomstat, the statistical office, also records other nationalities, such as Ukrainians, Belorussians, Armenians, Tatars and Jews. Even though these groups consti tute minorities in the country as a whole, the various ethnic groups are concen trated enough in a number of regions to make ethnic demands an important issue in the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations. 4 Another significant factor of diversity, and possibly of conflict and frustra tion between the regions and the centre, involves time zones and geographical distance between the federal capital and the regions. Because Russia has 11 time zones, many regions are unable to communicate with Moscow during regular working hours. The average distance between the capitals of the regions in the Far Eastern Area and Moscow is 9355 kilometres and the aver age time difference is eight hours. The average distance between regional cap itals and Moscow for the entire Russian Federation is 2633 kilometres and the average time difference is two hours.
Economic Disparities
Russia's regions are significantly disparate in industrial development and nat ural resource endowments. This has led to extremely high differences in gross regional product (GRP) per capita across the regions. In 1998, the difference between the region with the highest GRP per capita (Tyumen oblast, which has the largest deposits of oil and gas in Russia) and that with the lowest (Ingushetia republic) was 18-fold, with areas' ratios to the mean GRP per capita for Russia ranging from 3.8 to 0.2 (Table 8.5). The area averages for GRP per capita shown in the table hide some large disparities. For example, regions with high GRP per capita are Moscow and the republic of Sakha (Yakutia) in Siberia, which is rich in mineral deposits, while extremely poor regions include the Dagestan republic and other peripheral ethnic republics.
The transition period has done little to erase disparities, and if anything, economic disparities have become worse (see Sutherland and Hanson 1996 for a discussion of growing economic disparities in the early years of the tran sition). As Table 8 .6 shows, the ratio between the maximum and minimum values for regional personal income per capita, themselves expressed as ratios to the overall mean for Russia, increased from 3.8 in 1985 to 18.5 in 1999 , an almost 500 per cent increase. This trend has added to the challenge of design ing the right system of intergovernmental fiscal relations, especially the sys tem of equalization transfers.
Economic disparities are aggravated by significant differences in the cost of living across the regions, for instance, in 1999, the cost of the minimum regional subsistence basket was 470 per cent higher in Chukotskiy AO than in Ulyanov oblast. The most expensive regions are in the Far Eastern Area and the least expensive are in the Povolzhsk area. The disparities have arisen primarily because economic growth has increasingly been concentrated in a handful of regions and foreign direct investment (FDI) has been concentrated in an even smaller number of regions. Some areas that in the past depended more heavily than others on Moscow for transfers and subsidies, such as the Far Eastern and Northern areas, have suffered disproportionately from budget cuts and from the end of the Cold War era and the subsequent closing of many military facilities. In addition, changes in revenue sharing arrangements between the centre and the regions have allowed more income to stay in the resource-rich regions.
With the exception of growth of 0.5 per cent in 1997, the growth rate for Russia as a whole was negative during 1995-98, though it has improved in recent years. Area average growth rates followed much the same pattern, ranging from growth of 1.9 per cent in the Northern Area in 1998 to -14.5 per cent in the West Siberia Area that same year despite significant positive growth in 1995 and 1996. The largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, did well in terms of growth during this period, especially Moscow. Their sur rounding oblasts did less well. Natural resource-rich regions like Tyumen oblast experienced ups and downs in real GRP depending on oil prices. Other regions experienced what seem to be extremely large fluctuations in real GRP, but whether these represent reporting anomalies or not is unclear.
Ahrend (2000) investigates a number of possible factors that could help explain the difference in economic performance across the regions during the transition years. He finds that the most robust explanatory variable is the ini tial competitiveness of a region's industry, measured as the share of exports in total regional output. Other important factors in explaining performance were industrial structure, natural resource endowment and human capital. What is most controversial in Ahrend's findings is that political, institutional and reform variables did not seem to matter in explaining different growth rates across regions. Despite the wide belief that the degree to which a region implemented economic reform measures should have played an important role in explaining economic performance, Ahrend (2000) finds that initial conditions at the start of the transition played a much more important role. Similarly, de Melo, Ofer and Yossifov (1999) find that economic performance of the regional capitals along the Volga River was associated with favourable initial conditions; however, they also give economic reform an important role in explaining differences in performance.
One possibility is that the impact of economic reforms on economic growth works with a lag and therefore takes some time to be detected statisti cally. Another possibility is that positive initial conditions tend to be posi tively correlated with economic reform, and therefore disentangling the two types of effects is hard. At any rate, with few constraints on their lawmaking powers, the regions have come up with quite different legal and regulatory regimes (Polishchuck 2000) . These differences in economic and regulatory regimes are to a large extent manifestations of regional preferences and the autonomy the constitution provides to the regions. The starkest difference has been between a group of regions that have maintained intensive interventions in the economy through price controls, hurdles to interregional trade and the use of consumer subsidies, the so-called red belt regions, and many other regions that have followed liberal and more market-friendly policies. 5
Foreign Direct Investment Patterns
To date the opening of the economy to foreign investors has done little to reduce economic disparities across the regions. Indeed, FDI appears to have contributed to the widening disparities.
Clearly Moscow has benefited from being the political capital of the coun try and is by far the most attractive destination for FDI. During 1995-99, the city of Moscow accounted for 44.1 per cent of Russia's total FDI and Moscow oblast, the regional ring around the city, came in second place among the regions, accounting for 9.8 per cent of total FCI. Together this rep resents more than half of all FDI in Russia, and according to Goskomstat, the trend seems to have continued in more recent years. By contrast, the city of Moscow and Moscow oblast together represent about 20 per cent of Russia's gross domestic product. Because it is the capital, some FDI that has been recorded as taking place in Moscow may actually have ended up elsewhere. Nevertheless, in addition to being the country's finance and communications centre, Moscow has built up a significant industrial and services base.
The next most important destination for FDI has been St Petersburg and its surrounding region, Leningrad oblast. The two combined represented almost 8 per cent of total FDI in 1995-99. FDI has also been significant in several other regions. In some cases, it is related to gas and/or oil projects, for exam ple, in Sakhalinsk oblast and in Krasnoyarsk kray, but in other cases invest ments have been more diversified, as in Novosibirsk oblast with investments by Coca-Cola and other food processing enterprises and in Samara oblast with investments by the chemical, food processing and petroleum refining industries. Broadman and Recanatini (2001) analyse the distribution of FDI and find that the most important determinants are market size, infrastructure development and policy environment factors.
The Haves and the Have Nots
Disparities in economic conditions have led to a political split at the regional level, with two main coalitions lobbying the federal authorities in quite different directions. The first group consists of the rich or donor regions, that is, the regions that contribute in net terms to the federal budget. The second group consists of the poor or subsidized regions, that is, those that receive a net inflow of funds from the federal budget. The club of rich regions has had some mobility at the bottom, but permanent members include the city of Moscow, St Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Sverdlovsk, Volgograd, Tyumen, Khanty-Mansi, Krasnoyarsk and Sakha (Yakutia).
Policies to Reduce Interregional Income Disparities
This section highlights some of the main policies concerning revenue assign ments, federal expenditures and transfers that have had major impacts on regional disparities (see Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2001 for more details). Revenue assignments have evolved significantly during the transition. At the start of the transition, and despite all the problems it represented in terms of bargaining and discretion, the practice of regulation (or adjusting tax sharing rates for individual regions in a discretionary manner) provided the federal authorities with the significant advantage of being able, at least in theory, to equalize fiscal disparities across regions by reducing the rates at which taxes are shared in richer regions and increasing them in poorer regions. The drive to improve predictability and transparency in revenue assignments meant that after 1994, the federal authorities attempted to keep sharing rates stable over time and to make them uniform across regions, with the implication that all regions, rich and poor, had to be treated the same. Table 8 .7 summarizes rev enue assignments between the federal government and the regions during 1991-2002. Thus the attainment of more efficient and transparent revenue assignments resulted in even larger fiscal disparities between the regions and the federal government had to rely on a new system of equalization grants to offset some of the increased disparities in the distribution of fiscal resources. Whereas rev enue sharing arrangements were relatively stable from 1994 through 1997, several substantial changes were made in revenue sharing arrangements before and after the economic crisis of August 1998. Changes in the assignment of revenues, especially the assignment of personal income tax collections, reflect a tug-of-war over resources between the federal and regional governments. As Table 8 .7 shows, in recent years fiscal policy reforms have aimed at reassign ing tax revenues away from subnational governments and towards the federal government. The federal government's share of overall tax collections reached 60 per cent in 2001, up from a low of 42.5 per cent in 1997.
As noted earlier, a particularly important source of fiscal disparities is the extremely uneven distribution of natural resources, especially oil and natural gas. Actual revenues may also differ across regions because subnational gov ernments have been granted some degree of tax autonomy. This autonomy basically consists of the choice of tax rates up to a maximum rate for three taxes: the shared part of the enterprise profit tax, with different rates for finan cial institutions and other enterprises; the sales tax; and the enterprise assets tax. 6 However, with just a few exceptions, regional governments are making full use of their ability to raise taxes by charging the highest allowable rates for those taxes. Nevertheless, their ability to self-finance their budgets out of own and shared taxes varies considerably, ranging from 1 per cent in Madagasnk oblast to 100 per cent in the city of Moscow.
In addition to tax policy, the federal government's expenditure policies in the regions can increase or dampen fiscal disparities. One way to look at this issue is to observe direct expenditures by the federal government in the regions, which are difficult to calculate and involve some arbitrary assump tions (Table 8.8) . Setting aside the extremely large figure for federal direct expenditures per capita in the city of Moscow, which reflects the allocation there of 'unallocatable' items (such as a large share of national defence expen ditures, which cannot be easily identified with any particular area), the num bers in Table 8 .8 tell two main stories. First, federal direct expenditures seem to help equalize fiscal disparities, because they are larger in poorer, remote areas in the Northern Area, the East Siberia Area and the Far Eastern Area. Second, though not shown in the table, is that those regional governments that by treaty or unilateral action tend to retain a higher portion of federal tax rev enues, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, do indeed account for the lowest federal direct expenditures per capita by a wide margin.
The most important tool the federal government uses to address the prob lem of fiscal disparity is the system of intergovernmental equalization trans fers. This has been changing continuously during the transition as the formula used to allocate funds to the regions has continued to improve. After the 2000 reforms, the system improved in terms of its transparency, objectivity and minimization of negative incentive effects on revenue mobilization and expenditure efficiency by using measures of revenue capacity and expendi ture needs to arrive at fiscal disparities. Table 8 .9 shows total federal transfers by area for 1997-2000 and budgeted equalization transfers for 2001. As a per centage of the total, regions in the North Caucasian Area receive the largest amount of transfers, followed by regions in the Far Eastern Area. The Central Area is also an important recipient, as are West and East Siberia.
In per capita terms, the rankings are somewhat different, with the regions in the Far Eastern Area and the North Caucasian Area being significantly 
What Has Driven Federal Transfers to the Regions?
Investigators have carried out a considerable amount of research on the politi cal economy and equity of federal transfers in Russia. The question most often asked has been whether the goal of federal transfers is to attain such economic objectives as the equalization of fiscal capacity and expenditure needs among different levels of governments, or whether they actually reflect political economy considerations and purely asymmetric treatment and are governed by the political forces of the moment. Popov (2002) , Treisman *2 a u, « ( 1996, 2000) and others find that politics have been a major force in defining federal transfers to the regions, though the relevant political factors may have changed over time. For example, Treisman (1996) concludes that early on, the central government used federal transfers to appease troublemaking regions. Between 1992 and 1994, the regions that got treated most favourably were those that had not supported Yeltsin's government in the dispute with parlia ment and those that had made separatist noises through such actions as issu ing declarations of sovereignty. By contrast, during 1996 -98, Popov (2002 and Speckhard (1998) find that the regions that got treated better in terms of federal transfers were those that had supported the Yeltsin government in the 1995 parliamentary elections and the 1996 presidential elections. 8 However, other studies have emphasized that transfers have been roughly compatible with regions' fiscal needs, because the bulk of federal transfers has gone to the neediest regions, thereby partially accomplishing the desirable objective of equalization (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2001; McAuley 1997; Stewart 1996) . But as Solanko (1999) points out, whether politics or eco nomic and fiscal needs motivated transfers in the Yeltsin years may be hard to discern because of the correlation between poor socioeconomic conditions and the antireform and anti-Yeltsin sentiments among regions early on during the transition.
Countries in Transition

THE RATIONALE FOR ASYMMETRIC FEDERALISM
One of the ways the Russian Federation has managed to cope with such a high degree of diversity has been through the differential treatment of the regions, that is, the practice of asymmetric federalism. Russia is not alone in having adopted this approach. Many multinational democracies have done so (Stepan 1999 ). 9
Concepts
Even though asymmetric federalism has become a commonly used term, its meaning is not always clear and several dimensions need to be considered. To begin with, one can distinguish between de jure asymmetric treatment as opposed to de facto asymmetric treatment. In the first case, decentralization laws treat some regions more advantageously, such as providing them with wider revenue powers than other regions. In the second case, the advantage comes from how laws are actually implemented, basically discriminating in favour of or against particular regions by, for example, channelling additional funds to some regions in an ad hoc or nontransparent manner.
Another useful differentiation is between asymmetric treatment ex ante versus asymmetric treatment ex post. Asymmetric federalism implies the unequal treatment of regions ex ante, with regions having different powers and privileges for being what they are. Ex post most regions will almost cer tainly fair differently, because of the many other factors that affect outcomes in addition to the institutional policy framework provided by the central government.
Asymmetric federalism can manifest itself in different aspects of decen tralization. For example, as concerns political decentralization, some regions may have more autonomy than others to legislate and use the trappings of nationhood. In relation to administrative decentralization, regions may have different powers to set salaries and fire and hire personnel. In the case of fis cal decentralization, regions may have different revenue and expenditure assignments. 10 
Benefits
Asymmetric federalism can be used to accommodate diverse and more or less permanent preferences and appetites for autonomy across regions. Often the different demands for autonomy are based on regions' particular history . Asymmetric federalism can also be used to accommodate different regional administrative capabilities and state of readiness for decentralized management (Garcia-Mila and McGuire, Chap ter 7 in this volume). In the case of Russia, asymmetric fiscal arrangements appear to have arisen more from political considerations than from efficiency considerations. By accommodating different desires for regional autonomy and political independence, asymmetric federalism fit the early demands for independence by a number of ethnic republics. While Russian regions have quite different administrative capabilities, this never seemed to be a driving force for asymmetric federalism. Asymmetric federalism has also been explained as a way to address conflicts of interest and growing divergence between richer regions with stronger economic bases and more incentives to resist interregional distributions and poorer regions that are highly dependent on central transfers (Freinkman and Haney 1997) . Naturally regions with fewer resources are more inclined to oppose asymmetric decentralization because the asymmetry will likely protect the interests of the wealthier regions. This process has no doubt played a role in Russia.
Stepan (1999) makes an interesting point from a cultural and linguistic per spective. He argues that some groups of individuals in a country may only be able to participate fully as individual citizens if they acquire particular rights as a group. For example, the rights to schooling, media access and freedom of religious practice correspond to the groups' rights to use its own language and culture, therefore these different needs and preferences give rise to asymmet ric treatment in democratic environments. Initial conditions matter in these interpretations. For example, is the right to use a regional language an exam ple of asymmetric treatment or is the prohibition against using a regional lan guage an example of asymmetric treatment?
Costs
Asymmetric federalism obviously offers some advantages, whether tempo rary or more permanent, but not without costs. One cost is philosophical, in the sense that asymmetry means an absence of equal rights across the coun try. For example, if the republic of Tatarstan is allowed to retain a higher share of revenues than other regions, its citizens may receive a higher level of public services than residents in other regions. Asymmetry also tends to diminish the central government's ability to pursue national objectives, such as revenue mobilization for the delivery of services at the national level, or its ability to implement equalization at the subnational level. The asymmetric treatment of regions is often associated with a lack of transparency and with complex administrative relationships. A good example is the secret bilateral treaties the Russian federal government struck with many regions in the mid-1990s.
THE PRACTICE OF ASYMMETRIC FEDERALISM IN RUSSIA
Asymmetric federalism has played an important role in Russian federalism. From the start, asymmetric federalism played a crucial role in the struggle to keep the Russian Federation together. What followed were different manifes tations of asymmetric federalism, including customized bilateral treaties between the centre and the regions and an intense constitutional debate about the nature of the Russian Federation (Lynn and Novikov 1997) . Fundamen tally, however, asymmetric federalism started for pragmatic reasons. De facto asymmetry arose simply from the fact that several regions were demanding more autonomy and disregarding federal laws and the central authorities were incapable of enforcing federal laws."
The most intense demands and declarations of independence were coming from ethnic republics such as Tatarstan, Bahskiria and Chechnya. While in the case of Tatarstan and Bahskiria the situation was managed through the negotia tion of treaties with the federal government as early as 1993, in the case of Chechnya it led to a bloody civil war. A number of natural resource-rich regions, for example, Sakha (Yakutia) and Tyumen, demanded special arrange ments and treatment on the basis that they had been exploited for their natural resources, which had resulted in environmental degradation, and had never benefited from their wealth. Less aggressive in their demands, at least at the beginning of the transition, were the industrially well endowed and generally wealthier regions, but later on these regions joined the chorus of complaining regions, in their case arguing about being forced to subsidize poorer regions.
These different treatments became de jure asymmetric treatment when the new 1993 constitution made asymmetric treatment legal and standard. Legally, asymmetric arrangements were also formalized in the different char ters and constitutions of the regions, and in the case of many republics, their national constitutions appeared to be at odds with the constitution of the Rus sian Federation (Lynn and Novikov 1997) . The regional charters and constitu tions used a different definition of the bilateral relationship between the regions and the centre, especially in relation to specific arrangements relating to revenue and expenditure assignments.
After some six or seven years of transition, asymmetric federalism was being slowly but surely dismantled, a trend that started in the closing years of the Yeltsin presidency and accelerated after Putin became president. Indeed, one of Putin's first important moves was to cut back the power of regional governors, including assigning himself the authority to remove incompliant governors from office. This section takes a closer view of how asymmetric federalism has evolved in the Russian Federation. Russia's experience may provide one of the richest examples of asymmetric federalism, with all the advantages and disadvantages that come with it.
Russia's Path to Asymmetric Fiscal Relations, 1992-93
In the early years of the Yeltsin presidency (1992-93), pressures to contain and mitigate powerful centrifugal forces dominated intergovernmental fiscal rela tions. Many regions were attempting to position themselves to benefit as much as possible from the political and institutional weaknesses of the centre at this stage of the transition. These same regions often flaunted federal laws, and by doing so, imposed explicit costs and negative externalities on other regions. The federal authorities' desire to find conditions acceptable to troublemaking regions inevitably led to different forms of asymmetric fiscal federalism. 12 Regional assertiveness, especially on the part of the ethnic republics, reached its peak during 1992-93, when Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet (par liament) were involved in a power struggle. Even thought the Federation Treaty of March 1992 gave the ethnic republics some additional powers, the 1993 constitution took these powers away. However, the constitution itself opened the door to new forms of asymmetric treatment by virtue of allowing bilateral treaties between the federation and regional governments.
To a large extent, the asymmetric federalism of the early years of the tran sition was de facto. The regions ignored or disobeyed federal laws, in particu lar, several important laws enacted during the early period of transition, such as the 1991 Law on the Foundations of the Tax System in the Russian Federa tion (Igudin 1998; Lavrov 1998; Wallich 1994) . The ambiguity of the 1993 constitution about such fundamental questions as the inalienable rights of the regions did not help the situation (Teague 1996) , and these important issues were left to be decided in practice.
By allowing the federal government to enter into secret bilateral treaties with regional governments, the 1993 constitution legalized the practice of asymmetric federalism, and this became reality through the allegedly favourable treatment given to the ethnic republics of Tatarstan and Bashkor tostan in the first two treaties. This fits the view that the federal government provided systematically more advantages and privileges to the politically dif ficult regions to bribe the regional opposition and tame centrifugal forces. In short, Moscow has tended to reward rather than punish defiant regions. As Wallich (1994) and others argue, this type of response created an asymmetric federalist system starting in 1992 whereby, according to Lavrov (1995) , a pat tern was established that favoured the 21 ethnic republics over the other regions in the form of larger subsidies, permission to retain a higher share of tax collection, and special decrees granting economic benefits. While in early 1992 just a few regions had stopped or greatly reduced their remittances to the federal government, namely, Tatarstan, Chechnya, Sakha (Yakutia) and Bashkortostan, by the end of 1992 similar problems had arisen with 20 regions, and by 1993, this number had increased to 30 regions (Wallich 1994) .
Asymmetric Relations in 1994-97
The 1993 constitution's formal acceptance of asymmetric relations through bilateral treaties-which covered such issues as budgetary relations, state property, ownership and use of natural resources and migration-restored some predictability and order to the system of intergovernmental fiscal rela tions. While confrontations between the federal government and some regions continued to test the federation's strength during this period, the nature of these confrontations tended to shift from centrifugal tensions towards a com petition between the regions for special recognition and favourable fiscal arrangements.
The constitution declared all subjects of the federation equal, although it also granted the ethnic republics special rights, such as passing their own con stitutions. However, the constitution gave basically the same rights in one form or another to all the regions. 13 While the bilateral treaties provided an official acknowledgement of regional power, the general pattern of behaviour among the regions became less chaotic and threatening to Russia's unity with the notable exception of Chechnya. Another sign of the regions' power during this period was the regional governments' absolute discretion to organize their relationships with their local governments.
One central feature of the asymmetric treatment of the regions during this period was that not all the regions had a bilateral treaty with the federal gov ernment. Indeed, other regions' growing resentment against the ethnic republics had become apparent and not surprising. In 1995, many other regional governments tried and succeeded in getting bilateral treaties with Moscow. Although concessions granted to some regions affected bargaining with other regions, not all treaties came out the same (Solnick 1995) .
Many observers have concluded that the problems with Russian federalism during this time were the manifestation of a weak federal government, the absence of cooperation between the centre and the regions and a common pool (or 'tragedy of the commons') problem. This is a main theme in Blanchard and Shleifer (2000); Lavrov, Litwack and Sutherland (2000); and OECD (2000) . Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) , in particular, emphasize that the contrast between the success of China's transition versus the failure of Russia's occurred because China was able to retain a strong political centre.
Mending Russia's fiscal federalism problems required strengthening the political and institutional power of the centre relative to the regions (see also the discussion in Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2001; Shleifer and Treisman 2000) , and Russia would have to wait until Putin's election as president for a significant turnaround in the relationships between the centre and the regions. However, the situation may have involved more than a weak centre. For example, de Figueiredo, Rui and Weingast (2001) observe that a problem with Russian federalism was the lack of appropriately defined limits on the central government. They maintain that in some way the federal government was too strong, given its ability to change rules pertaining to and extract rents from the regions, which detracted from the regions' perceptions of benefits result ing from participation in the federal relationship. From this perspective, solv ing the problem of noncooperation required not only more power for the centre, but simultaneously credible limits on the centre, which had acted and could continue to act without self-restraint in the pursuit of its own interests. For example, at the start of the transition the federal government dumped expenditure responsibilities on the regions without adequate funding and has continued to control virtually all tax and regulatory powers, while the regions depend on the centre for most of their budget funding and are therefore sub ject to the whims of federal authorities.
Retreat from Special Treatment: Yeltsin 1998-99
In addition to generating mistrust and resentment among the regions, asym metric federalism in general, and the bilateral treaties in particular, had other significant costs. One of them was the mounting fiscal pressure on the federal budget that became increasingly noticeable during the first six months of 1998 (see, for example, World Bank 2001). The conflicting budget demands at the regional and federal levels and the federal government's inability to col lect revenues eventually resulted in a federal deficit as high as 10 per cent of gross domestic product. At the same time, both the federal and regional gov ernments continued to borrow heavily domestically and abroad. All levels of government also proceeded to accumulate payment arrears while becoming more frequent users of mutual settlements (noncash offsets) and barter. The combination of increased deficits, tight money supply and fixed exchange rates led to the August 1998 crisis, with the devaluation and floating of the ruble and the federal government's default of most of its domestic debt, which in turn precipitated a banking crisis. The August 1998 crisis provided the federal government with an opportu nity to re-evaluate its policies on many fronts, including its budgetary rela tionships with the regions. One of the issues examined was the role the bilateral treaties had played in the crisis. This examination showed that the special fiscal treatment provisions in the treaties had contributed to the mounting fiscal pressures that eventually led to the crisis. Undoing the dam age caused by the bilateral treaties and special deals proved difficult. Never theless, the retreat from asymmetric treatment clearly started in the late Yeltsin years by the federal government simply not always complying with provisions in the treaties. At this time, the federal government also started a serious recentralization of fiscal resources (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2001) . These efforts involved introducing deeper tax reforms that eventually included the Tax Code, the Budget Code, the Law on the Financial Founda tions of Local Self-Government and the so-called concept of reform of inter governmental relations in the Russian Federation for 1999-2001. Another law, the Law on the Principles for the Demarcation of Jurisdictions and Pow ers, enacted in June 1999, clearly restated the supremacy of the federal consti tution, federal legislation and federal decrees over regional constitutions, legislation and decrees. One clear feature of all these documents was the new willingness of the federal government to intervene in fiscal arrangements between regional governments and their local governments.
The Putin Era: 2000-02
Putin came to power in March 2000 with what now seems a clear mandate to control the regional governments and re-assert the role of the federal authori ties. For example, in May 2000, the Chief Prosecutor's Office declared that 60 regions had local laws, including regional charters or constitutions, that seri ously contradicted federal laws, and in June 2000, Putin's appointed chief pros ecutor gave the regions one month to synchronize their laws with federal laws.
This was just the beginning. Following his election, Putin took a number of steps to strengthen the federal position in relation to the regional govern ments. In May 2000, he issued a decree that divided Russia into seven groups of regions (the federal districts), each with a presidential envoy (or plenipo tentiary) to monitor regional legislation and ensure that regional administra tions were abiding by federal laws. Furthermore, the State Duma (or lower house of parliament) approved legislation that gave the Russian president the power to suspend regional legislation that conflicted with federal law, as well as the power to dismiss regional governors if their actions were judged to be in violation of federal statutes. The makeup of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of parliament, was redone by replacing the governors with regional representatives elected by the regional legislatures. In the past, as members of the Federation Council the regional governors had often played an obstructionist role. These legal changes gave the federal authorities effec tive instruments to deal with even the most recalcitrant regions, excluding Chechnya. The best evidence that the federal government has regained much authority is that Tatarstan is adopting amendments to its constitution to bring it closer in line with the Russian constitution and other legislation (East West Institute 2002a). Nevertheless, some regions are resisting, for example, Bashkortostan is holding on to its declaration of sovereignty and President Murtaza Rakhimov has run for office a third time on his sovereignty platform (East West Institute 2002b).
Putin's administration continued the recentralization of revenues that had started in the late years of the Yeltsin administration. Following his election to the presidency, Putin managed to get four chapters of the second part of the Tax Code approved by the State Duma, which had a profound impact on regional finances. Subnational government turnover taxes, which provided a substantial level of own source revenues for local and regional governments, were substantially reduced and are scheduled to be eliminated, and the over haul of the personal income tax also reduced subnational revenues.
HOW WELL DID ASYMMETRIC FEDERALISM WORK?
Given the significant differences among Russia's regions, including different demands for fiscal and political autonomy, and the extremely weak institu tions at the federal level, allowing asymmetric decentralization was the right thing to do. But what is interesting about Russia's experience with asymmet ric federalism is that its practice was not at first a voluntary or conscious pol icy choice by the federal authorities. Instead, as noted earlier, asymmetric policies were forced onto the federal government by the unilateral actions of some regional governments. After a while, asymmetric federalism was for mally adopted in the constitution approved in 1993 as an explicit and deliber ate policy of the federal government. In recent years, the trend has been reversed, with deliberate efforts made to eliminate the most important mani festations of asymmetric federalism.
The difficult question is whether asymmetric federalism was a cure for national frailties or a poison of the national body politic. The answer is that it was probably both a cure and a poison at different times during the transition. Initially, the asymmetric treatment of regions served to stem the enormous centrifugal forces in operation at the start of the transition. The positive results occurred at a time when federal institutions were weak and unable to enforce its national laws (Solnick 1995) . Its fear of being unable to enforce legislation may have caused the federal government to consider bilateral negotiations as a solution. Thus Moscow's strategy of buying consent from the regions was largely imposed by circumstances and was the only demo cratic way out. Prior to the introduction of the bilateral treaties, Moscow was having a hard time holding the country together. Separatist threats and resis tance to federal policies by a group of regional governments were constant.
The bilateral treaties had the strategic effect of weakening any coordinated action and demands by the ethnic republics that had been most antagonistic to Moscow. The treaties are also widely acknowledged as having prevented the secession of some of those ethnic republics, such as Tatarstan. 14 The net impact of asymmetric federalism in the first half of the transition decade was probably to rein in the powerful centrifugal forces that existed in Russia at that time. 15 Naturally, we cannot know how things would have developed if different decisions at been made at the time. For example, the conflict in Chechnya undoubtedly had a profound impact on the scope and depth of other regions' demands. Thus the moderating effects of asymmetric federalism may have resulted from how Moscow handled the Chechnya con flict. From early on, many in Moscow appeared to view the conflict in Chech nya as the line in the sand for the future viability of the Russian Federation. The supporters of armed intervention emphasized the need to bring the seces sionist leadership to heel to prevent the break-up of the entire country (Lapidus 1999) .
However, what had been a solution to a serious problem soon turned into a serious problem itself. Asymmetric treatment of what were supposed to be equal subjects of the federation rapidly gave rise to resentment, lack of soli darity and noncooperative behaviour by the regions, leading to a situation akin to the tragedy of the commons. A weakened federal government was unable to stop this process. By 1995-96, asymmetric federalism was increas ingly poisoning the national fabric. Because of asymmetric federalism, almost all the regions had an incentive to deviate from cooperative behaviour and press for special treatment with the federal authorities or try to take matters into their own hands, such as illegally retaining federal revenues (see Eckardt 2002 for a discussion of some of these issues). For many observers, large and sustained federal budget deficits, the federal government's inability to impose fiscal discipline and the financial crisis of 1998 were all associated with the form of fiscal federalism practiced. The privileged treatment of some regions was an important flaw in Russia's federalism that had to be changed as dispar ities grew in terms of the quality and quantity of public services (MartinezVazquez and Boex 2001) . In this respect, the dilemma the government faced is familiar to any country trying to develop its regions in a balanced way. Maintaining living standards in all regions may actually retard overall eco nomic development. Perhaps a more important manifestation of the system's inadequate performance was the extensive failure to harmonize regional and national interests: a number of regions and their governors appeared to be willing to inflict high costs on the rest of the country for minimal gains to themselves.
Not long after the crisis of August 1998, consensus arose about the need to retreat from the asymmetric treatment of the regions and to rein in regional governors. Even though the federal government tried to do this in the later years of the Yeltsin administration, it did not happen until Putin's election as president.
WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
Russia's system of fiscal federalism will continue to evolve in the future. The Russian Federation is still a young country, as reflected by its system of fiscal decentralization. Of course, international trends affect Russia as much as they do other countries, and one of these trends is globalization. As some regions increase their commercial links with other parts of the world, the value of the domestic market and other common domestic institutions may be diminished for these regions, resulting in more centrifugal pressures, especially in the farflung areas such as the Far East, the North Caucasian and the Northwest areas, although for the present the main beneficiaries of globalization have been the city and oblast of Moscow, neither of which are likely to adopt a sep aratist agenda. At the same time, international trade increases the federal gov ernment's leverage through its control of customs, pipelines, railroads and so on. Thus, for example, shipments of oil from landlocked Tatarstan are entirely in the hands of the federal authorities. In the past, Moscow has refused to issue import-export licenses to companies headquartered in troubled regions or threatened to close oil pipelines.
On the domestic front, several important issues will take centre stage in the immediate future. Flow the federal government addresses these issues will define Russia's fiscal federalism in the decades to come. The first issue is asymmetric federalism and the status of the bilateral treaties. After several years of Putin's administration, as noted earlier, the need for asymmetric fed eralism has been put into question. When running for president in early 2000, Putin was clear about his intentions to restore and strengthen the authority of the federal government over the regions. He has kept this election promise. Most regions have ceased to act from a 'what can we get' perspective and have begun to ask 'what can we keep' from the concessions won during the past seven or eight years. Thus the regional mavericks are in retreat, but they are far from defeated. In relation to the bilateral treaties, the official view in Moscow during the Putin administration years has been that they are an important impediment to the rationalization and reform of intergovernmental fiscal relations. While some regional governors renounced their bilateral treaties with Moscow soon after Putin had made his opposition to them pub lic, others adamantly refused to give them up. Not surprisingly, ethnic and richer regions have been more likely to try to keep their treaties with Moscow in place. In his annual address to the State Duma in April 2002. Putin reiterated his position that the bilateral treaties signed 'behind the backs' of the other regions have outlived their usefulness. He also made the point that if any of these treaties remain in place, they should be approved by the State Duma so that 'everyone knows who has what preferences and why'.
The second issue is the growing fiscal disparity and whether national soli darity can address this. Economic disparities will probably continue to increase, because of the sites selected for domestic and foreign investment and because of the concentration of natural resources. In turn, pressure on the federal budget to redress the imbalances will also increase. Inevitably, regard less of the form the equalization system takes, the additional resources will have to come from the better-off regions. The question is how much tolerance these regions will exhibit towards poorer regions, which in some cases the richer regions may perceive as inefficient or corrupt. Without support from the richer regions, it will become harder for the federal government to under take effective equalization, but growing disparities and concentrations of poverty will pose political risks, especially at the periphery of the country. Putin's popularity and his ability to maintain good relations with the regions and the State Duma may stave off these tendencies for some time, but the underlying problems are unlikely to dissipate and could flare up.
The third issue is whether the federal government will intervene any fur ther in the restructuring of the relationships between regional and local gov ernments. The current administration continues to stress its strong support for local governments, and the federal government has worked on several propos als to provide separate assignments at the local level. How these will translate into concrete legislation on fiscal issues, such as separate revenue and expen diture assignments or mandated formula transfers, remains to be seen. Of course, if approved such changes would weaken the grip of regional govern ments and governors over local governments.
The fourth issue is whether the federal government will push for adminis trative and political reform in the regions. Consolidation of the regions into fewer regions, which would not only reduce administrative costs, but could also help address the need for asymmetric arrangements and for fiscal equal ization, is an issue that has been discussed for some time. In particular, a series of proposals originating with the State Duma suggest either allowing regions to merge on a voluntary basis or forcing them to merge. The most repeated proposal is the elimination of the ten AOs and one autonomous oblast and their assimilation by the surrounding oblasts and krays. Many have interpreted Putin's recent creation of the seven federal districts headed by directly appointed plenipotentiaries as the first step towards regional consoli dation. However, even more recently, Putin has made it clear that he does not want the federal districts to develop into quasi states or quasi republics. Thus far, the federal districts have been used to de-concentrate federal power and exercise more active and effective supervision of the regions' actions.
An important recent development in relation to fiscal federalism was Putin's appointment of a high-level commission in 2001, known as the Kozak Commission, to redefine and reform intergovernmental fiscal relations. The commission issued recommendations in September 2002, but Putin decided to send the recommendations to the State Council, a consultative body, for fur ther consideration before sending any bills to parliament. These recommenda tions include the need to adequately fund each level of government according to its assigned expenditure responsibilities, which may be interpreted as more money and tax autonomy for subnational governments. The increase in rev enue autonomy will not negate the need for transfers, because only a tiny minority of Russia's 13 000 local governments have enough money to meet or exceed their present expenses with their current revenue assignments).
One of the most divisive issues is the reassignment of revenues from taxes from natural resources. The Kozak Commission report appears to argue that these revenues should be recentralized and then redistributed more fairly among the regions. Furthermore, the commission recommends abandoning the so-called two key practice, whereby both federal and regional govern ments must provide licenses for the exploitation of natural resources, for full and exclusive federal control. Naturally the natural resource-rich regions are completely opposed to this suggestion.
Russia has made a remarkable journey over the past decade. It has returned from the brink of disintegration and chaos to become a young, but still fragile, democracy. The challenge for the future remains, however, to find the appro priate balance between the rights of the regions, including respect for and acceptance of their diversity, and a federal government capable of enforcing the law and protecting and defending common national interests. Whether this balance can be maintained in the future without the asymmetric treatment of the regions and with respect for basic democratic principles remains to be seen. 
